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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN T. CURNUTTE, 
Plat"vntiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
UTAH GAS SERVICJ1_j COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant, 
ERMA RANSDELL, doing business 
as THE LARIAT CAFE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
JUNE CURNUTTE, 
Plaint~ff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
UTAH GAS SERVICE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant, 
ERMA RANSDELL, doing business 
as THE LARIAT CAFE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
8971 
(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the 
record. The parties will be referred to here as they 
appeared in the trial court.) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
We will answer the· points in the Brief of Appellant 
in the order in which they are there set forth. Generally 
the facts recited in the brief are sufficient. We will 
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refer to any additional facts under the specific point 
where they may become material. 
Our contention is that within Rule 56 (c) L"tah Rules 
of Civil Procedure there was no genuine issue as to any 
1naterial fact and therefore the trial court properly en-
tered a summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the 
issue of liability. See Holbrook v. Websters Inc., 7 utah 
2d 148, 320 P. 2d 661 (1958), Abdulloadir v. Western 
PacifVc R. R. Co., 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P. 2d 339, Holland v. 
Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 rtah 2d 303, 293 P. 2d 700, 
Jlatiu,itch vs. Hercules Powder Co., 3 L"tah 2d 283, 282 
P. 2d 1044, Ulibarri v. Christenson, :2 17tah 2d 367, 275 P. 
2d 170, Jlorri·s v. FarnSU'Orth Jlotel, 1:23 rtah 289, 259 
P. 2d 297, Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 6-1:6, :2±4 P. :2d 862. 
The defendant in her pleadings has admitted the 
LTtah Gas Service Company was negligent in installing 
its gas pipes at the Lariat Cafe and in disconnecting 
the propane gas lines therefrom. It has admitted that 
this negligence was the proxnnate cause of the injuries 
received by plaintiff June Curnutte and of the death 
of Hoberta Lynn Curnutte. 
It appears frmn the record without dispute that 
defendant operated the Lariat Cafe and invited the pub-
lic to cmne into her place of business. ~\lso, it appears 
from her deposition that she en1ployed the Utah Gas 
Service Cmupany to install gas pipes in her cafe in order 
that she might use gas in conducting her business. The 
propane lines being in use, it w·as necessary, in perform-
ing th i R installation to disconnect thmn. 
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All the above facts are not in dispute. The question 
of whether or not this negligence of the gas company 
should be imputed to defendant is not a question of fact 
but one of law and under the authorities this negligence 
should be imputed to the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT ERMA RANSDELL IS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF UTAH GAS SERVICE COM-
PANY IN THE INSTALLATION OF THE NATURAL GAS 
PIPES AND IN THE REMOVAL OF THE PROPANE GAS 
LINES. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT ERMA RANSDELL HAS NOT BEEN DE-
PRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO AMEND HER ANSWER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT ERMA RANSDELL IS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF UTAH GAS SERVICE COM-
PANY IN THE INSTALLATION OF THE NATURAL GAS 
PIPES AND IN THE REMOVAL OF THE PROPANE GAS 
LINES. 
The best statement of the principles upon which 
plaintiffs rely for recovery is stated in Prosser on Torts 
(2d Ed.) 357 as follows: 
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"The employer of an independent contractor 
may be liable for any negligence of his own in 
connection with the work to be done. But the 
common law 'rule' has been that he is not liable 
vicariously for the torts of the contractor. To 
this rule certain 'exceptions' have been developed, 
which indicate a tendency to place the contractor 
upon the same footing as a servant. The more 
i1nportant exceptions are : 
''a. Where the employer is under a duty to 
the plaintiff which the law considers 
that he is not free to delegate to the 
contractor. 
''b. Where the work to be done is inherently 
dangerous to others, or will be danger-
ous unless particular precautions are 
taken. 
·•Even under these exceptions, it is commonly 
held that the employer will be liable only 
for risks inherent in the work itself, and 
not for 'collateral' negligence of the con-
tractor." 
The case at bar comes within both of these so-called 
'·'pxceptions." Prosser further states on the smne page: 
"Against this argument (of no control- no 
vicarious liability), it has been contended that the 
enterprise is still the employer's, since he remains 
the person pri1narily to be benefited by it; that he 
selects the contractor, and is free to insist upon 
one who is financially responsible, and to demand 
indemnity from hi1n, and that the insurance neces-
sary to distribute the risk is properly a cost of his 
business. Upon this basis, the prediction has been 
made that ultimately the 'general rule' will be 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
that the employer is liable for the negligence of 
an independent contractor, and that he will be 
excused only in a limited group of cases where he 
is not in a position to select a ·responsible con-
tractor, or the risk of any harm to others from 
the enterprise is obviously slight. The English 
courts have taken steps in this direction, until the 
position of the ordinary independent contractor 
approaches that of a servant. The American 
courts, while they have not gone so far, have 
whittled away at the rule of non-liability with 
exceptions, to the point where it is not easy to sa~ 
that any 'general rule' remains." 
We will consider the admitted facts and the au-
thorities under each one of these so called exceptions. 
Non-Delegable Duty 
Under the indisputed facts in this case, defendant 
had a non-delegable duty to her patrons to keep and 
maintain the premises of the Lariat Cafe in a reasonably 
safe condition. She could not delegate this duty to any-
one. There can be no question that maintenance of the 
gas pipes and their proper installation would be a part 
of this non-delegable duty. The defendant was operating 
a public place and inviting members of the public to come 
in and eat at her cafe. She thereby assumed this obliga-
tion. 
Prosser on Torts (2d Ed.) 359, states the rule as 
follows: 
"Again, it has been held in many instances 
that the employer's enterprise, and his relation to 
the plaintiff~ is such as to impose upon him a duty 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
which cannot be delegated to the contractor. It 
has been mentioned earlier thaf there are numer-
ous situations in which it may be negligence to 
rely upon another person, and the defendant is 
not relieved of the obligation of taking reasonable 
precautions himself. But the cases of 'non-dele-
gable duty' go further, and hold the employer 
liable for the negligence of the contractor, al-
though he has himself done everything that could 
reasonably be required of him. They are thus 
cases of vicarious liability. Such a duty may be 
imposed by statute, by contract, by franchise or 
charter, or by the common law. The catalogue is 
a long one: the duty of a carrier to transport its 
passengers in safety, of a railroad to fence its 
tracks properly or to n1aintain safe crossings, and 
of a municipality to keep its streets in repair; the 
duty to afford lateral support to adjoining land, 
to refrain from obstructing or endangering the 
public highway, to keep premi,ses reasonably safe 
for business visitors, to provide employees ~rith a 
safe place to work, and many others. It is diffi-
cult to suggest any criterion by which the non-
delegable character of such duties may be deter-
mined, other than the conclusion of the courts that 
the responsibility is so important to the com-
Inunity that the employer should not be permitted 
to transfer it to another. So far as they 
may be willing to broaden the category in the 
future, the law may approach an ultimate rule 
that any duty which can be found to rest upon 
the employer himself cannot be delegated to an 
independent contractor." 
The rule is stated in 2 Harper & James, The Law of 
Torts, § 26.11, page 1406, as follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
"There are also situations wherein the law 
views a person's duty as so important and so 
peremptory that it will be treated as non-dele-
gable. Defendants who are under such a duty 
' ... cannot, by employing a contractor, get rid of 
their own duty to other people, whatever that duty 
may be.'" 
* * * 
"Smne common law duties are also non-dele-
gable. Thus the landlord's duty of care to keep 
the common approaches in reasonable condition 
. for several tenants, and the land occupier's duty 
of care to keep the premises reasonably safe for 
invitees or for adjacent owners or highway travel-
ers, may not be avoided by the employment of 
independent contractors. In all these cases thE> 
employer is as liable for the conduct of the con-
tractor as though it were his own." 
The principle relied upon is also set forth in 2 Re-
statement of the La.w of Torts, § 425, as follows: 
"One who employs an independent contractor 
to maintain in safe condition 
(a) land which he holds open to the entry of 
the public as his place of business, or 
(b) a chattel which he supplies for others to 
use for his business purposes or which 
he leases for immediate use, 
is subject to the same liability for bodily harm 
caused by the contractor's negligent failure to 
maintain the land or chattel in reasonably safe 
condition, as though he had retained its mainten-
ance in his own hands/' 
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Two of the illustrative cases show that this section 
is particularly applicable to the case at bar: 
"1. A operates a department store. He em-
ploys the B Elevator Company to repair his ele-
vators therein. Due to the negligence of the B 
Company, the elevator is dangerously defective. 
It falls and harms C who has come to buy and 
D who has come to the shop to look over the goods 
displayed. A is subject to liability to C and D. 
''2. A operates a hotel. He employs B as a 
plumber to install a shower bath. B negligently 
transposes the handles so that the hot water pipe 
is labeled cold. C, a guest, deceived by the label, 
turns on the hot water and is scalded. A is sub-
ject to liability to C." 
8 ectton 422 also applies this same principle: 
·•A possessor of land who entrusts the repair 
of a building or other structure thereon to an 
independent contractor is subject to the same lia-
bility to persons within or outside the land who 
are injured by the contractor's negligent failure to 
put or maintain the building or structure in rea-
sonably safe condition as though he had retained 
the making of the repairs in his own hands.'' 
It is stated in the comment at Page 1138 as follows: 
"* * * The duty which a possessor of land owes 
to others to put and n1aintain it in reasonably safe 
condition is nondelegable. If an independent con-
tractor, no matter how carefully selected; is em-
ployed to perform it, the possessor is answ·erable 
for harm caused by the negligent failure of his 
contractor to put or maintain the buildings and 
structures in reasonably safe condition, irrespec-
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tive of whether the contractor's negligence lies in 
his incompetence, carelessness, inattention or 
delay." 
The following cases recognize and apply the prin-
ciple here contended for by plaintiff. Knell v. Morris, 
39 Cal. 2d 450, 247 P. 2d 352 (1952), Brown v. George 
Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P. 2d 929 
(1943), Bazzo.Z~ v. Nance's SaniftariJum, 109 Cal. App. 2d. 
232, 240 P. 2d 672 (1952) Oourtell v. McEachen, (Cal. 
.App.) 315 P. 2d 351 (1957), Myers v. Lilttle Church By 
The Side of the Road, 37 Wash. 2d 397, 227 P. 2d 165, 
(1951), Snyder v. Southern California Edison Co., 44 Cal. 
2d 793, 285 P. 2d 912 (1955), Grimnell v. OarbiJde & Oar-
bon Chemicals Corp., 282 Mich. 509, 276 N.W. 535, Bailey 
v. Zlotnick, 149 F. 2d 505 (DC-1945), Lilienthal v. Has-
timgs Olo,tht"ng Co., 131 Cap. App. 2d 343, 280 P. 2d 824 
(1955); Gvll v. Krussner, 11 N.J. Super. 10, 77 A. 2d 462 
(1950). 
We submit that all of the foregoing cases are au-
thorities in favor of plaintiffs' position. We will review 
and quote from only a part of them. 
In the Knell case, supra, a non-suit was reversed. 
Plaintiff owned a luggage store and the floor above was 
occupied by defendant MacMar, Inc. It had a water 
heater which began to leak. Defendant Morris, a plumb-
er, was called to fix it. He used a radiator compound, 
left the heater going, and it leaked, causing plaster in 
plaintiff's place of business to fall. In reversing this-
dismissal the court stated: 
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"Inasmuch as the evidence is sufficient to 
support a finding that Morris was negligent, it 
was error to grant a nonsuit as to MacMar, Inc. 
The fact that Morris was acting in the capacity of 
an independent contractor does not necessarily 
absolve the corporation from liability. The gen-
eral rule of nonliability of an employer for the 
acts of an independent contractor is subject to 
numerous exceptions. See Brown v. George Pep-
perdine Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P. 2d 929; 
McCordic v. Crawford, 23 Cal. 2d. 1, 142 P. 2d 7; 
Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 17 ·Cal. 2d 594, 
110 P. 2d 1044; Snow v. Marian Realty Co., 212 
Cal. 622, 299 P. 720; Luce v. Holloway, 156 Cal. 
162, 103 P. 886; Rest., Torts, §§ 410-429; Prosser 
on Torts, 1933, p. 645 et seq.; 23 A.L.R. 984. 
There is evidence in the present case which is 
sufficient to support finding in favor of plaintiffs 
under at least one of these exceptions, and it is 
unnecessary for us to consider whether MacMar 
may be liable under any other theory. 
"It is well settled that the possessor of land 
is answerable for the negligent failure of an inde-
pendent contractor to put or maintain buildings 
and structures thereon in reasonably safe condi-
tion. See Rest., Torts, § ±22. This principle was 
recently applied in Brown v. George Pepperdine 
Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P. 2d 929, to hold 
the owner of premises liable for the defectivf 
condition of an elevator." 
In the Bazzoli case, supra, an action was brought t 
recover for personal injuries. Defendant en1ployed plaii 
tiff to put an additional layer on the floor in defendanf 
building. Defendant agreed to chip the first layer G 
cement so the second layer would stick and it employed 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
one Grimsley to do this. Plaintiff went upon the floor 
to pour the cement, his leg went through the floor and into 
a reservoir of scalding water underneath. Judgment for 
plaintiff was affirmed. Defendant argued that Grimsley 
was an independent contractor. Following the Brown 
case, supra, the court stated: 
"Even though we were able to agree with 
appellant's contention that Grimsley was an in-
dependent contractor, this would not relieve ap-
pellant from its obligation and duty toward an 
invitee as hereinbefore set forth." 
In the Lilienthal case, supra, a clothing store owner 
and an independent contractor that waxed the store floor 
were sued for personal injuries received by plaintiff who 
fell on the floor. Judgment for defendants was reversed 
for errors in the instructions. The court stated : 
"The questioned instruction included the fol-
lowing advice : 'If a person does work for another, 
as an independent contractor, then under the law 
the person for whom the work was done is not 
responsible or liable for any act done by such 
independent contractor.' 
"In many cases that would be a correct state-
ment, but not in this case. A store owner does not 
discharge his full duty toward business invitees by 
delegating care of the premises to an independent 
contractor. 'It is well settled that the possessor 
of land is answerable for the negligent failure of 
an independent contractor to put or maintain 
buildings and structures thereon in reasonably 
safe condition.' Knell v. Morris, 39 Cal. 2d 450, 
456, 24 7 P. 2d 352, · 355. See also Brown v. George 
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Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 260, 143 
P. 2d 929; McCordie v. Crawford, 23 Cal. 2d 1, 
142 P. 2:d 7; Restatement of the Law of Torts, 
§ 422." 
We submit that the negligence of the Utah Gas Serv-
ice Company an independent contractor, is imputable to 
defendant Erma Ransdell on the grounds that her duty 
to her patrons and members of the public was nondele-
gable. It was the same as though defendant herself negli-
gently installed and disconnected the gas pipes. 
Inherently Dangerous 
The installation and removal of gas lines is inher-
ently dangerous to others and certainly would be danger-
ous unless particular precautions are taken to prevent 
leakage. 
Both natural gas and propane gas have explosive 
propensities. If they are permitted to leak in buildings 
they accumulate and any spark or flame may touch off 
an explosion. Gas must be handled with care to prevent 
this from happening. Hence the work which defendant 
employed Utah Gas Service Company to do comes within 
this so called exception to the rule insulating an employer 
of an independent contractor from liability. The acts of 
the Gas Company in installing and removing the gas 
lines became the acts of defendant and since negligently 
performed, she is liable for the resulting damages. Pros-
ser on Torts ( 2d Ed.) 360, 2 Harper and James, The 
Law of Torts § 26.11, page 1408. 
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The rule is stated in 27 A.m. Jur. 515, Independent 
Contractors, section 38, as follows: 
"It is well settled that one who orders work 
to be executed, from which, in the natural course 
of things, injurious consequences must be expect-
ed to arise unless means are adopted by which 
such consequences may be prevented, is bound to 
see that necessary steps are taken to prevent the 
mischief, and such person cannot relieve himself 
of his responsibility by employing someone else, 
whether the contractor employed to do the work 
from which the danger arises or some third per-
son, to do what is necessary to prevent the work 
from becoming wrongful. This rule is sufficiently 
comprehensive to embrace, not only work which, 
from its descriptions, is 'inherently' or 'intrinsi-
cally dangerous,' but also work which will, in the 
ordinary course of events, occasion injury to 
others if certain precautions are omitted, but 
which may, as a general rule, be executed with 
safety if those precautions are adopted." 
The principle is thus propounded in 2 Restatement 
of Law of Torts, § 427: 
"One who employs an independent contractor 
to do work which is inherently dangerous to others 
is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to 
them by the contractor's failure to exercise reason-
able care to prevent harm resulting from the 
dangerous character of the work." 
This Court recognized the dangerous characteristics 
of gas in Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 99 Utah 
496, 108 P. 2d 254, (1940) when it stated: 
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"It is true that as a supplier of a dangerous 
substance a gas company is bound to high degree 
of care * * *." 
The courts generally recognize the highly dangeroni' 
character of gas and its tendency to escape. See Anno-
tation 26 A.L.R. 2d 136 at 146. This same view is taken 
of butane gas. Annotation 17 A.L.R. 2d 880 at 88'1. 
Applications of this exception or principle may be 
found in the following cases: Burke v. Thomas (Okl.), 
313 P. 2d 1082 (1957) ; Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331, 
128 P. 2d 856 (1932); Thompson-Cadillac Co. v. Mat-
thews, 173 Wash. 353,\23 P. 2d 399 (1933); Pendergrass 
v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P. 2d 231 (1953); Fegles 
Construction Co. v. McLaughlin Constructi:an Co., 205 F. 
2d 637 (9CCA-1953). 
We submit that installation and removal of the gas 
pipes were such operations that from their very nature 
injurious consequences could be expected unless n1eans 
were adopted to avoid those consequences. The installa-
tion and removal of pipe are fraught "ith potentialities 
of danger to any persons who might be in and about the 
cafe. Hence the negligence of the gas cmnpany is inlput-
able to defendant under this principle. 
BRIEF OF APPELLA.A'T 
We will here undertake to answer the arguments 
made by defendant in her brief in the order in whieh 
they there appear. 
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Non-Liability of Employer of 
Independent Contractor 
(Brief of Appellant, page 11) 
Defendant asserts that an employer of an independ-
ent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the 
independent contractor, contending that our Supreme 
Court has recently so held in Morley v. Rodman, 7 Utah 
2d 299, 323 P. 2d 717. 
The issue presented in the case at bar was not before 
the court in the Morley case. No contention was made 
that the defendant owner of the automobile would be 
liable for the negligent acts of the driver even if he 
were an independent contractor. It was apperently con-
ceded by the parties that if the driver were an independ-
ent contractor there would be no liability on the part of 
the owner. 
The facts of the Morley case would not bring it 
within any of the exceptions mentioned in the Restate-
ment, Prosser, or Harper and James heretofore cited. 
Defendant also quotes from Prosser (2d Ed.) p. 143 
§ 32 under the subject Negligence-Standard of Conduct. 
The footnote, as might be expected, refers to the section 
where the subject Independent Contractors is discussed 
(Section 64, p. 357). These latter rules are the ones 
applicable and it clearly appears that the case at bar 
comes within the "exceptions" to the rule that an em-
ployer is insulated from liability for the negligent acts 
of an independent contractor. As stated by Prosser (2d 
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Ed.) 358 the "exceptions" recognized by the courts have 
reached a point where it is doubtful there is any so called 
"general rule" of non-liability. 
Duty of Owner or Occupier of Premises 
(Brief of Appellant, pages 11-16) 
We do not quarrel with the rules announced by the 
authorities in this portion of the defendant's memoran-
dum. 
This is not a case of a plaintiff slipping on the floor 
of defendant's cafe and a reliance on negligence of the 
defendant herself (De Weese v. J. C. Penny Co., 5 Utah 
2d 116, 297 P. 2d 898; Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 
· 2d 356, 284 P. 2d 477; Pennock v. Newhouse Realty Co., 
97 Utah 408, 93 P. 2d 482). 
This is a case of negligent installation of gas pipe~ 
and negligent removal of propane lines permitting gas 
to escape and causing an explosion. The defendant Erma 
Ransdell, through a company for whose acts she was 
responsible, negligently installed and removed gas pipes. 
If an occupier of premises herself should undertake 
to install or remove gas pipes and did it negligently so 
that an explosion occurred causing injury to plaintiff the 
rules announced under this portion of defendant's brief 
would not insulate her against liability. It 'viii not do to 
say in the case at bar defendant didn't do it personally 
because under the exceptions here applicable she is r(>-
sponsible for the acts of the installer and remover. 
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Leonard v. Enterprise Realty Company, 187 Ky. 578, 
219 S.W. 1066, 10 A.L.R. 238 (1920), is not in point. The 
tenant moved out of the premises and either a person 
employed by him or someone unknown left the gas cock 
open causing gas to fill the apartment, which exploded 
when plaintiff lit a match on entering. The court spe-
cifically pointed out the gas cock was not left open by 
anyone who was under the control of or "connected" 
with the defendant landlord. That case is a far cry from 
a situation where a company is employed by the occupier 
of the premises to install and remove gas pipes and it 
does so negligently, particularly if the general public is 
invited to the premises involved. 
Defendant again sets up a straw man and knocks it 
down when she emphasizes that the occupier of the 
premises is not an insurer of the safety of persons in-
vited to enter. Plaintiffs do not contend for any such 
rule. The contention is a simple one which defendant 
does not, and cannot, meet. It is simply that defendant 
Erma Ransdell is responsible for the negligent acts of 
the gas company in installing and removing gas pipes 
from premises to which she invited the public and the 
installation and removal of which are dangerous unless 
special precautions are taken. 
Gleason Case 
(Brief of Appellant, pages 16-18) 
.Defendant cites and quotes from Gleason v. Salt 
Lake City,·94 Utah l; 74 P. 2d 1225 (1937). .and contends 
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that this caseis autho,rity against plaintiff. That case is 
not in point. The quotation on page 18 of Brief of Appel-
lant discloses the vast distinction between that case and 
the case at bar. There can be no contention here that 
defendant could not anticipate that the gas company was 
going to install the pipes and remove the lines and that 
in so doing special precautions would have to be taken 
to avoid danger to persons coming into the cafe. Also 
in that case the condition was not one on the inside of 
defendant's place of business and where defendant in-
vited members of the public to come. Also, there is a vast 
difference between handling a hose for water and pipes 
for a substance with the dangerous characteristics of gas. 
The following quotation in that case from Ohio 
Southern R. Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207, 24 K.E. 269, 
shows that this Court did not have in mind a case such 
as the one at bar: 
"One who causes work to be done is not liable, 
ordinarily, for injuries that result from careless-
ness in its performance by the en1ployes of an 
independent contractor, to whom he has let the 
work, without reserving to himself any control 
over the execution of it. But this principle has no 
application where a resulting injury, instead of 
being collateral and flowing from the negligent 
act of the employe alone, is one that might have 
been anticipated as a direct or probable conse-
quence of the performance of the work contracted 
for, if reasonable care is omitted in the course of 
its performance. In such case, the perso-n causing 
the work to be done will be liable, though the 
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negligence is that of an employe of an independent 
con tractor.'' 
The case at bar comes within the exception here 
referred to. 
Inherently Dangerous 
(Brief of .Appellant, page 18-20) 
Defendant takes the position that there was nothing 
dangerous about the installation of pipes because there 
was no gas in them and hence this case does not come 
within the exception contended for by plaintiff. 
This overlooks the obvious. If no gas was to be put 
In the pipes, then of course the work would not be 
dangerous. But that is not the case here. Everyone knew 
and anticipated that gas would be put in the pipes. This 
latter fact is the one that made the work dangerous to 
others if proper precautions were not taken. 
Paraphrasing the language of Prosser (page 357), 
this work would be dangerous to others unless particular 
precautions were taken against leakage because gas was 
going to be run through the pipes. If gas leaked there 
would· be a likelihood of accumulation and explosion. If 
the propane lines were not properly removed there also 
was the likelihood of a dangerous accumulation of pro-
pane, gas and an explosion. 
We cannot just consider the mere physical work of 
installing and removing pipes. .An inseparable part of 
this work was' that it was performed so that gas could 
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be used in. the cafe. and_ of_ necessity. run .through these 
pipes. 
Restatement, Section 415 
(Brief of Appellant, pages 20-21) 
Plaintiff does not contend that this principle of law 
applies here. Becauseit is inapplicable does not elimi-
nate from this case the principles enunciated in sections 
422, 425 and 427. For liability to be present under sec-
tion 415 of course those elements set forth in the italicized 
portion of the quote on page 21 must be present but the)' 
need not be present for sections 422, 425 and 427 to 
apply. 
We assert the negligent acts of the gas company are 
imputable to defendant, not that defendant was herself 
negligent. We do not have to prove her negligence if 
she is responsible for that of the gas company. 
Collateral Negligence 
(Brief of Appellant, pages 22-26) 
The ultimate objective of the gas company and the 
defendant Erma Ransdell under their contract "-as to 
install the gas pipes and remove the propane lines safely 
with the exercise of reasonable care. Under the pleading~ 
this was not done, but on the contrary the installation and 
removal was negligently perforn1ed. This was not so 
called "collateral" negligence. It was directly concerned 
with the job the gas cmnpany was hired to do. 
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The distinction between collateral negligence and 
negligence for which an employer of an independent con-
tractor is responsible is well pointed out in 2 Restatement 
of the Law of Torts, Section 426, p. 1147: 
"The negligence of a contractor in the course 
of performing work entrusted to him by his em-
ployer, which does not make the result fall short 
of that which it would be the employer's duty to 
attain, had he done the work himself, is collateral 
negligence." 
ln the case at bar the negligence in installing and 
removing gas pipes made the result fall short of that 
which the gas company contracted to do in its contract 
with the defendant Erma Ransdell. The gas company 
::;hould have installed and removed with due care. The 
illustration given further points up this distinction (p. 
1147): 
"A employs B, a competent contractor, to 
excavate a cellar on land immediately adjoining 
a public highway. The contract requires B to pro-
vide the fence necessary to prevent pedestrians 
from falling into the excavation. A is liable to C, 
a pedestrian, who falls into the excavation because 
the fence as erected by B is flimsy or because B 
has not erected the fence as his contract required. 
A is not liable to D, a pedestrian hurt by the care-
lessness of B's worlanen in handling the timbers 
while they are erecting the fence or by the careless 
handling of tools while so doing." 
2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, page 1410, 
Section 26.11, further points up this distinction: 
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"Even where the employer's duty is nondele-
gable, however, and from whatever source the 
nondelegable duty may be derived, the employer 
will not be liable for negligence of the independent 
contractor that is 'collateral' to the nondelegable 
duty. The owner of a building may be under a 
nondelegable duty to his invitees to use care to 
keep it reasonably safe and he will be liable for a 
defect negligently created or allowed to remain 
by a builder called in to make repairs. But he will 
not be liable to the invitee or the builder's negli-
gence in dropping a tool on his head. Where the 
duty is nondelegable because of the inherently 
dangerous character of the work, conduct is 'col-
laterally negligent' when it does not involve the 
risks that made the work peculiarly dangerous. 
Painting a sign over the sidewalk and blasting 
are examples of inherently dangerous tasks (with-
in this rule). Yet if the painter or blaster negli-
gently ran over a pedestrian on the highway while 
bringing supplies to the job, his negligence would 
be collateral, and the employer would not be vi-
cariously liable for it." 
It is obvious that the case of Callahan v. Salt Lake 
City, 41 Utah 300, 125 P. 863, falls within the category 
of collateral negligence. There the street contractor in 
connection with its work of excavating the street, per-
mitted dirt to fall into a gutter thus stopping the flow of 
water which flooded plaintiff's property. The situation 
is analogous to the builder's negligence in dropping a tool 
on the head of a passerby, which is mentioned in the fore-
going quotation from Harper & James. 
In the case at bar if the gas company employee had 
negligently hit s01neone with a tool or piece of pipe, 
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defendant could escape liability, but that result does not 
occur where the negligence is in the installation or re-
moval itself. 
In King v. Mason, (La.), 95 So. 2d 705, cited by 
defendant, the independent contractor was employed by 
the city to install a sewer. Incident to excavation work, 
a gas line was cut. This distinguishes that case from the 
one at bar. There was no occupant or possessor of prem-
ises who invited members of the general public into his 
place of business and the independent contractor ha~ 
nothing to do with the installation or work on gas pipes. 
If a dangerous gas could come from the sewer pipe and 
it had been negligently installed so as to permit leakage 
the cases would be the same. 
The case of Schermerhorn v .. Metropolitan Gaslight 
Co., 5 Daly 144, has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
case at bar. The quotation from 18 Am. Jur., Electricity, 
Section 58, is merely a general statement of the rule 
relating to electricity which doesn't explode. Defendant 
emphasizes some parts of that quotation, but fails to 
emphasize the following: 
"There are, however, circumstances under 
which duties are imposed upon one which he can-
not delegate to another." 
The negligence here relied upon is the negligence in 
the installation and removal of the pipes which proxi-
mately caused an explosion and does not include a situa-
tion where the gas service company dropped a hammer 
on some one. 
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We submit that the trial court properly ruled that 
the negligence of the gas company was imputable to 
defendant. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT ERMA RANSDELL HAS NOT BEEN DE-
PRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY. 
In Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific Railroad Company~ 
7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P. 2d 339 ( 1957) plaintiff, against whom 
a summary judgment had been entered, contended he had 
been denied a trial by jury. This Court said: 
"We are in accord with the idea that the 
right of trial by jury should be scrupulously safe-
guarded. This, of course, does not go so far as to 
require the submission to a jury of issues of fact 
merely because they are disputed. If they would 
not establish a basis upon which plaintiff could 
recover, no matter how they were resolved, it 
would be useless to consume time, effort and ex-
pense in trying them, the saving of which is the 
very purpose of summary judgment procedure. 
The pertinent inquiry is whether under any view 
of the facts the plaintiff could recover. It is ac-
knowledged that in the face of a motion for dis-
missal on summary judgment, the plaintiff is en-
titled to have the trial court, and this court on 
review, consider all of the evidence which plaintiff 
is able to present, and every inference and intend-
ment fairly arising therefrom in the light most 
favorable to him." 
The purpose of a summary judgn1ent is well stated 
in Ulibarri v. ChriJstenso·n, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P. 2d 170 
(1954) : 
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"The motion for summary judgment is for 
the purpose of expediting procedure and obviat-
ing trials where no genuine issue of fact exists." 
[n the case at bar whether or not the admitted negli-
gence of the Gas Service Company was imputable to de-
fendant is a matter of law as indicated under Point I 
hereof. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
for a jury to try. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO AMEND HER ANSWER. 
Whether or not defendant's motion to amend her 
answer should have been granted or denied rested within 
the discretion of the trial court. In its consideration of 
this point this Court is limited to a determination of 
whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion. 
Defendant admitted that the Utah Gas Service 
Company negligently installed its gas pipes and negli-
gently disconnected the propane gas lines at the Lariat 
Cafe; further admitted the explosion and that the negli-
gence of the Gas Service Company proximately caused 
injuries to plaintiffs. 
The defendant's motion was made after the argu-
ment for a summary judgment. Upon defendant making 
her motion, plaintiff filed a certified copy of defendant's 
complaint against the Utah Gas Service Company filed 
in the United States District ·Court for the District of 
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Utah (51-55). In the Federal Court action defendant here 
was plaintiff there and in her complaint alleged as fol-
lows: 
"3. That defendant, Utah Gas Service Com-
pany, is engaged in the business of distributing 
natural gas, particularly in the area in and around 
Monticello, San Juan County, Utah; that on and 
before August 12, 1956, the defendant company 
installed its gas lines in and to the Lariat Cafe 
at Monticello, Utah for the purpose of selling 
natural gas at said cafe. 
"4. That at all times herein alleged, the 
plain tiff was the owner of the premises and the 
building known as the Lariat Cafe and the fix-
tures and equipment used therein in the restau-
rant and cafe business; and that the plaintiff at 
all times alleged herein and up to and including 
August 13, 1956, was engaged in the restaurant 
and cafe business under the name of Lariat Cafe. 
"5. That the defendant, Utah Gas Service 
Company, negligently installed its gas lines and 
negligently disconnected the propane gas lines at 
the Lariat Cafe. 
"6. That after the said installation of the 
gas lines and the disconnection of the propane 
gas lines as aforesaid and on the 13th day of 
August, 1956, as a direct and proxilnate result of 
the aforesaid negligent acts of the defendant, an 
explosion occurred in the Lariat Cafe. 
"7. That at the time of the said explosion, 
plaintiff was working in the said Lariat Cafe in 
the conduct of her regular business; that as a 
direct and proximate result of the said negligent 
acts of the defendants, plaintiff suffered serious 
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physical injuries, including IDJUries to and loss 
of the use of her right arm, permanent injury to 
her right eye and to her brain, permanent scars 
on her face, permanent injury to her left leg, 
extreme physical shock to entire nervous system, 
and that as a proximate result of said injuries 
and of the said negligence of the defendant, the 
plaintiff suffered and will continue to suffer 
physical and mental pain and suffering, all to her 
general damage in the amount of $100,000.00." 
These are substantially the same allegations as con-
tained in plaintiffs' complaint in the case at bar and 
which defendant admitted. The trial court was certainly 
justified in refusing to permit the defendant to play fast 
and loose with the courts. Her right to recover was based 
upon the negligence of the gas company and it was 
within the trial court's discretion to refuse to permit the 
defendant to back away from her solemn allegations and 
admissions concerning the negligence of the gas com-
pany. 
In any event the defendant still alleges that the gas 
company was negligent in installing its pipes and as 
heretofore indicated under Point I, this negligence is 
imputable to defendant as a matter of law. The explo-
sion, under the undisputed evidence, occurred inside the 
cafe and wherever the leak came from it of necessity 
entered the cafe. The negligent installation of a pipe 
which could create this result would come within the 
rule contended for by plaintiffs. Defendant's denial of 
the interpretation of negligence in the proposed amend-
ment is merely a denial of a conclusion of law which 
must be resolved against defendant. 
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We submit the trial court properly denied defend-
ant's motion to amend her answer, not only for the reason 
that it was not an abuse of discretion, but also for the 
reason that the, amendment would have accomplished 
nothing. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that there was no genuine issue as to an; 
material fact presented in this case once defendant ad-
mitted the negligence of the Gas Service Company and 
that this negligence proximately caused the injuries and 
death for which plaintiffs here seek to recover. The 
question of imputing this negligence to defendant is a 
matter of law and the trial court correctly entered a sum-
mary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defend-
ant on the question of liability. 
We submit that the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE~ ROBERTS 
& BLACK 
ADAMS, PETERSON & ANDERSON 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS 
Counsel for Respondents 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
